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Background We assessed change in household catastrophic health care expenditures (CHE)
and inequality in facing such expenditures in south-west Tehran.
Methods A cluster-sampled survey was conducted in 2003 using the World Health Survey
questionnaire. We repeated the survey on the same sample in 2008 (635 and 603
households, respectively). We estimated the proportion of households facing CHE
using the ‘household’s capacity to pay’. We identified the determinants of the
household CHE using regression analysis and used the concentration index to
measure socio-economic inequality and decompose it into its determinants factors.
Results Findings showed that the proportion of household facing CHE had no significant
change in this period (12.6% in 2003 vs 11.8% in 2008). The key determinants of
CHE for both years were health care utilization and health care insurance status.
Socio-economic status was the main contributor to inequality in CHE, while
unequal utilization of dentistry and outpatient services had reduced the
inequality in CHE between socio-economic groups.
Conclusions We observed no significant change in the CHE proportion despite policy
interventions aimed at reducing such expenditures. Any solution to the problem
of CHE should include interventions aimed at the determinants of CHE. It is
essential to increase the depth of social insurance coverage by expanding the
basic benefit package and reducing co-payments.
Keywords Catastrophic health care expenditure, inequity, health care expenditures,
decomposition, Iran
KEY MESSAGES
 We found no significant change in the proportion of households in District 17 of Tehran facing catastrophic health care
expenditure (CHE), despite major policy initiatives during the study period.
 Inequality in facing CHE also had no significant change in this period.
 Any solution to the problem of CHE should include interventions aimed at the social determinants of CHE.
Published by Oxford University Press in association with The London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine
 The Author 2012; all rights reserved. Advance Access publication 25 January 2012
Health Policy and Planning 2012;27:613–623
doi:10.1093/heapol/czs001
613
Introduction
Those receiving health care services face at least two important
economic consequences: the direct costs of the service
(demonstrating itself as out-of-pocket expenditure), and the
loss of income and productivity (Murray et al. 2003a). Direct
health care costs have serious repercussions for health: they
discourage people from using services and encourage them to
postpone health checks (WHO 2010). Such costs may increase
to a level that forces individuals and families to cut back on
other goods and service consumption (e.g. food and clothing)
and to sell assets, puts them at risk of being trapped
in long-term debt and, in short, disrupts their standard
of living now or in the future (Pradhan and Prescott 2002;
Van Doorslaer et al. 2007). Such costs and expenditures are
labelled ‘catastrophic’. Technically, catastrophic health care
expenditures (CHE) are described as health care expenditures
which exceed certain fractions of total household income (Berki
1986; Wyszewianski 1986; Wagstaff and Van Doorslaer 2003;
Van Doorslaer et al. 2007). As defined in the World Health Report
2000, catastrophic expenditure represents the failure of the
health system to protect the public from the financial conse-
quences of health care (WHO 2000). The Report contributed to
the attention given by policymakers and academics in many
countries towards assessing household health care expenditures
and describing households with excessively high expenditure
(Narayan et al. 2000; World Bank 2000; Baeza et al. 2001).
As well as measuring the amount of household expenditure,
it is also important to measure inequalities in facing such
expenditures. The most disastrous consequences of CHE occur
for the poor, as they may be forced to ignore their vital needs to
attain health services in such a way that limited resources
remain for them for bare necessities such as food and shelter
(O’Donnell et al. 2008). Where some households spend a
catastrophically high share of their capacity to pay on health
care, extreme horizontal inequality occurs (Xu et al. 2003a).
There is no consensus on the threshold above which health
care expenditures are considered catastrophic (Xu et al. 2007).
The World Health Organization has suggested the cut-off value
of 40% of household capacity to pay (Xu et al. 2003b).
The proportion of households facing catastrophic expenditure
varies in different countries, depending on their health care
system, social structure and economic profiles (Xu et al. 2003c).
Xu et al. (2007) reviewed reports from 89 countries and reported
a range from less than 0.01% in the Czech Republic, Slovakia
and the United Kingdom to 10.5% in Brazil and Vietnam
(Xu et al. 2007). Two studies that used sub-national data
reported higher proportions of households facing catastrophic
expenditures; 6–15% in Burkina Faso and 12% in Brazil
(Su 2006; Barros and Bertoldi 2008).
Financing health care in Iran
In Iran, primary health care is financed and delivered mainly by
the public sector. Secondary and tertiary care are delivered both
publicly and privately. After a period of gradual decline in per
capita expenditure on health care in the 1990s (Iran NHA team,
no date), the country has observed a significant rise in health
care expenditure in the 21st century. Per capita health care
expenditure more than doubled from 2004 to 2008 from US$120
to over US$240, while in the same period household consumption
expenditure per capita increased from about US$870 to over
US$1100 (Trading Economics 2011). This suggests that an
increasing share of household expenditure is diverted towards
health care, especially as household out-of-pocket payments
contribute over 50% of health care expenditure (WHO 2006).
The health care financing arrangements in the country are
multitude and complex. There are four main health insurance
schemes: Medical Services Insurance, Social Security Insurance,
Armed Force Medical Services (for members and families of
armed forces and veterans) and the Imam Khomeini Relief
Fund (for the poor) (WHO 2006). The medical services and
social security insurance schemes mainly cover employees (and
their families) of the government and of private and
semi-private registered companies and workshops, respectively.
In 1995 the parliament approved a law requiring the govern-
ment to provide universal coverage for all people. Since then
smaller insurance funds under the major schemes have been
developed to cover the insurance gaps, e.g. for those suffering
from certain chronic diseases, voluntary insurance for the
self-employed and a limited coverage for rural inhabitants.
Most importantly, in 2005 an expanded rural insurance fund
(under the medical services scheme), merged with a family
medicine programme, was approved and implemented (Takian
et al. 2011). It covered all those living in rural areas and small
towns of less than 20 000 population. A growing market also
exists for complementary private insurance.
Two more specific insurance plans developed in this period
include ‘on-the-bed inpatient insurance’ (also called ‘urban
inpatient insurance’) and Article 92 of the 4th Economic, Social
and Cultural Development Plan that called for free-of-charge
treatment of those injured in car accidents. ‘On-the-bed’
inpatient insurance is insurance coverage for urban people
who are without other insurance and are admitted to public
hospitals. The insurance is offered on-the-bed and became
instantly effective. It resulted in unexpected costs for the
medical services insurance that was obliged to offer the service.
The other initiative covers all the related health care costs of
traffic accident victims admitted to public hospitals, and is paid
directly to the hospitals. This is important as traffic injuries are
a major cause of mortality and morbidity in Iran, resulting in a
burden of disease higher than any other disease category (Jafari
et al. 2009). The scheme is funded using an ear-marked tax on
cigarettes and soft drinks as well as third-party car insurance
and was welcomed by the hospitals.
The insurance schemes have variable coinsurance payments
from 0 to 30% of the expenditure, depending on the type and
location of health care. Despite the development of the
insurance schemes, a large proportion of health care expend-
iture is paid out-of-pocket, estimated at 58% in 2001 (WHO
2006), suggesting the coverage is not adequate. This has at least
two causes. First, official estimates suggest that still about 10%
of the population is not covered by any insurance (unofficial
estimates suggest the figure may be closer to 20%) (World Bank
2007). Second, users spend more on health care than the
formal coinsurance levels propose, as certain services are not
covered by insurance and both ambulatory and inpatient care
providers frequently impose extra costs for those services on
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patients. As a result, Article 90 of the 4th Economic, Social and
Cultural Development Plan of Iran (time span 2004–09)
set policy goals of reducing out-of-pocket payments to
less than 30% and the proportion of households facing
CHE from the estimated level of over 2% to less than 1%
(Planning and Management Organization of the Islamic
Republic of Iran 2003).
In this study, we estimate the proportion of households facing
CHE in 2003 and 2008 in one District of Tehran. We assess
whether the proportions are significantly different, and the
demographic and socio-economic determinants of CHE in each
year. We also analyse socio-economic inequality in CHE. Such
analyses help decision makers in formulating policies and
allocating health system resources towards vulnerable groups
(Hosseinpoor et al. 2006).
Methods
Study design
This is a longitudinal study involving two household surveys
conducted in 2003 and 2008. We substituted missing house-
holds in 2008 with neighbouring households based on a
predefined protocol.
Study population
We selected a representative sample from the 17th District of
Tehran. This district [population: 260 000; households: 71 000
(Statistical Centre of Iran 2007)] has a relatively low socio-
economic status compared with the rest of the city (Shahandeh
et al. 2003). District 17 is an inner city district in the south of
Tehran with relatively low socio-economic status. The district
had been selected for the 2003 survey, as the Tehran University
of Medical Sciences had established a community-based
participatory research centre (the only one in Tehran) in the
district to identify health needs and conduct interventions to
improve health in that area. The survey was among several
studies that were conducted to assess the needs and priority
research areas that could contribute to improving population
health. The 2008 survey was conducted in the same district to
use the opportunity of assessing changes over time. This
provided a unique opportunity to conduct such a comparison.
Questionnaire
The World Health Survey (WHS) is a valid, reliable and
comparative instrument developed by the World Health
Organization for countries in order to monitor health system
performance (U¨stu¨n et al. 2003). The WHS contains two main
sections: the household questionnaire and the individual
questionnaire.
In this manuscript we report the results of the household
questionnaire. It includes the following modules: ‘household
roster’, ‘health intervention coverage’, ‘health insurance’,
‘health expenditure’, ‘indicators of permanent income’ and
‘health occupation’ (U¨stu¨n et al. 2003).
We used two recall periods for expenditure questions in each
survey: the last 4 weeks for total household and health care
expenditures, and the last 4 weeks and the last 12 months for
outpatient and inpatient expenditures, respectively.
Data collection
From each household, a member who was 18 years or older and
aware of the household expenditures and health service usage
was eligible to respond to the questionnaire. Each household
was approached for data at most 10 times in 2003 and 5 times
in 2008 to reduce non-response. If the participants were not
available after 10 (5 in 2008) contacts, the household was
substituted with a neighbouring household.
To ensure data validity we interviewed again (via phone) all
2008 households who reported CHE.
Sampling and sample size
The 2003 survey used cluster sampling and the primary
sampling unit was geographically identified building blocks in
the district. Sixty-four clusters were identified via systematic
sampling from the geographical sampling frame developed by
the Statistical Centre of Iran for the district (Heshmat et al.
2003; Shahandeh et al. 2003; Rashidian et al. 2011). These
clusters were distributed geographically in the district and each
cluster (i.e. building block) included up to 18 households from
which some households were randomly selected to answer the
expenditure module of the questionnaire.
The 2003 sample covered 1123 households, from which
expenditure data were collected for 635 households, out of
which 579 households (91.2%) provided data suitable for
analysis (Figure 1).
In 2008, we approached the households that were sampled
in the previous survey. Exact addresses for 603 households
(out of 635) were available to us. Nineteen households were
non-existent (unoccupied, changed to non-residential, demol-
ished) or unavailable and eight households were unwilling to
respond, and were replaced with neighbouring households.
Eleven households provided incomplete data, giving us an
effective sample of 592 households (Figure 1).
Ethical issues
The study was approved by the Ethics Committee of the Tehran
University of Medical Sciences. The participants signed or
marked (if illiterate) the informed consent forms.
Statistical analysis
We conducted two main statistical analyses to measure house-
hold CHE, and to assess inequality in facing CHE. Economic
status of households was determined based on their total
monthly expenditures.
Catastrophic health care expenditure
Following Xu et al. (2003c) we considered health care expend-
iture ‘catastrophic’ if it was equal to or higher than 40% of the
household capacity to pay, and defined a binary variable to
capture this. Capacity to pay was defined as effective income
(measured by total expenditure) minus basic subsistence needs
adjusted for household size. Xu et al. (2003c) have reported the
methodology in detail.
Determinants of catastrophic health care expenditure
We used logistic regression analysis to assess the role of the
determining variables (insurance status, sex of household head,
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size, having a member over 65 years, having a member below 5
years, having a disabled member, economic status, reporting
dentistry service usage, reporting inpatient service usage and
reporting outpatient service usage) on the CHE. We repeated
the regression analyses after removing the health service usage
variables from the models to ensure the effects of demographic
variables on the CHE were not masked by usage variables.
Inequality in catastrophic health care expenditure
A concentration index was used to measure socio-economic
inequality in CHE in each period. Household total expenditure
was used for the socio-economic status.
Determinants of inequality in catastrophic
health care expenditure
It is important to understand what is behind observed
socio-economic inequalities in CHE, as it is not always
straightforward. We use an example to explain the importance
of identifying the determinants of inequality. Suppose a poor
household never uses dentistry care, e.g. because they cannot
afford it, and hence they do not face catastrophic expenditure
because of it. On the other hand, if a wealthier household uses
the service more, their chances of facing catastrophic expend-
itures is increased. While the poor households may face CHE
due to essential care, wealthy households may face CHE
because of ‘luxury’ care. In such cases, the ‘inequality’ gap in
CHE between different socio-economic groups is reduced, but
for the wrong reasons. Decomposition analysis is a tool to
understand the observed inequalities.
We followed the methods proposed by Wagstaff et al. (2003)
to ‘decompose’ the concentration index of CHE into its deter-
minant variables. To do this we calculated the concentration
index of the CHE and each of the determinant variables,
as well as the absolute and percentage contribution of each
variable to the concentration index of CHE. The details of the
method are explained in Wagstaff et al. (2003) and other
studies (Wagstaff et al. 2003; Hosseinpoor et al. 2006; Van De
Poel et al. 2007). A technical note is available from the authors
upon request. As decomposition is a linear model, we used
the natural logarithm of the odds of the health care expend-
iture in the model instead of the observed CHE (Hosseinpoor
et al. 2006).
Results
After omitting the households with incomplete information
(e.g. households who reported zero food expenditure), 579
households in 2003 and 592 households in 2008 remained for
further analysis.
78.9% and 73.6% of households in 2003 and 2008, respect-
ively, were covered by health insurance. Univariate analysis
showed that in both years, poorer quintiles had more uninsured
households (P value < 0.05 in 2008). Table 1 reports the
demographic profiles of the study sample households.
Comparing 2003 with 2008, household size reduced from 4.2
to 3.9, in line with demographic changes in the country. Mean
household monthly health care expenditure increased substan-
tially in this period.
Zero health care expenditure was reported by 29% and 21% of
the households in 2003 and 2008, respectively. Our data reveal
that in 2003, 73 households [12.6%; 95% confidence interval
(CI): 10–15%] faced CHE, compared with 70 households
(11.8%; 95% CI: 10–14%) in 2008.
64 clusters * 18 households 
1123 households (demographic data)
635 households (expenditure data) 
Available addresses for 603 households 
27 (substituted households) 576 (same households) 
592 households with
complete data (2008) 
579 households with
complete data (2003) 
2003
2008
Final
a
n
alysis
 
Figure 1 Sampling design
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Determinants of catastrophic health
care expenditure
Univariate analyses showed that having a member over 65
years and having disabled members in 2008 resulted in a
statistically significant difference between households facing
CHE and other households (Table 2). In 2003 and 2008, CHE
was more likely to occur in the lower socio-economic quintiles,
although it reached statistical significance in 2008 only
(Table 2). Also households facing CHE were more likely to
report using inpatient, dentistry and outpatient service usage.
Table 3 provides the estimated odds ratios obtained from
logistic regression analyses. As data on some variables including
household head, disabled members and outpatient visits were
not collected in 2003, we generated two models for 2008 data:
one comparable to 2003, and the other including all variables.
Lack of insurance increased the probability of incurring CHE
[Odds Ratio (OR) in 2003: 1.9 (95% CI: 1.1–3.5); OR in 2008:
2.4 (95% CI: 1.3–4.6)] (Table 3). Use of dentistry services
increased the odds of facing CHE almost 4 times (95% CI:
2.3–7.2) in 2003 and 4.6 times (95% CI: 2.4–8.9) in 2008.
Hospitalization increased the probability of incurring CHE by
3.5 times (95% CI: 1.6–7.7) and 11.4 times (95% CI: 3.8–34.6)
in 2003 and 2008, respectively. Furthermore, for each additional
outpatient visit the odds of facing CHE increased 1.5 times
(95% CI: 1.3–1.8) in 2008 (Table 3).
Households in the poorest quintile were more likely to face
CHE; the odds of catastrophic expenditure for the first quintile
in 2003 sample were 3 times, and in 2008 sample 5 times, that
of households in the 5th quintile (Table 3). Repeating regres-
sion models after removing health services usage variables
resulted in few changes in the findings. As a result the
insurance variable was no longer significant in the 2008
models. Also in the complete model of 2008, having a disabled
member in the household increased the odds of facing CHE
(1.31; 95% CI: 0.64–2.63).
Inequality in catastrophic health care expenditure
The concentration indices of facing CHE were 0.17 (95% CI:
0.30 to 0.04) and 0.19 (95% CI: 0.32 to 0.06) for 2003
and 2008, respectively. A negative value of the concentration
index shows that poor households had higher probabilities of
facing CHE in both study samples. Testing concentration curve
dominance indicated no statistically significant dominance of
one curve against the other, which means no significant change
in inequality in CHE between 2003 and 2008 (Figure 2).
Decomposition of socio-economic inequality in
catastrophic health care expenditure
Table 4 shows the concentration index and relative contribu-
tions of each determinant of inequality in CHE. The fifth
column demonstrates the concentration index of each variable
which implies the extent to which the respective variable is
distributed across wealth. Concentration indices of the determin-
ant variables such as having household members over 65 years
or less than 5 years and having disabled members are negative,
which means these variables are higher amongst the poor. On
the other hand, health services use variables (except inpatient
service use) have a positive concentration index, implying higher
use of these services among the better-off (Table 4).
The last column of Table 4 shows the grouped contribution
from the categorical variables. A positive contribution to
socio-economic inequality means that the relevant variable
raises inequality, and vice versa. The findings indicate that the
majority (83%) of observed inequalities can be attributed to
households’ economic status. Household size, insurance status,
having members aged over 65 years, disabled members, and
members under 5 years old increased inequality, favouring the
rich. Health service usage was another contributor to inequality.
Dentistry service usage (7%) and outpatient visits (2%)
contribute negatively to socio-economic inequality, suggesting
that unequal usage of such services resulted in the reduction of
inequality in CHE in different socio-economic groups.
Discussion
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study using the
decomposition method to analyse inequality in CHE. It is also
among the few examples of studies that have assessed CHE
over time (Sun et al. 2008; Mataria et al. 2010).
Our study has five important findings. We observed that no
significant change occurred in the proportion of households
facing CHE despite major policy initiatives in this period; that
inequality in facing CHE had no significant change in this
Table 1 Demographic characteristics of the study population, District 17, Tehran
Variables 2003 2008
Mean of household monthly total expenditure (in Iranian Rials) 3 063 955 3 835 511
(US$340) (US$426)
Mean of household monthly health expenditure (in Iranian Rials) 250 801 672 848
(US$28) (US$75)
% households with disabled member – 17.4%
% households with female head – 12.4%
% households having member over 65 years 13% 20%
% households having member under 5 years 22% 18%
% households having health insurance 78% 74%
Household size 4.2 3.9
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period; that the main contributors to CHE are similar to
previous studies; that there is a discrepancy between our
findings and the CHE calculated at the national level using
routine data; and that necessary dental care is an important
contributor to CHE in Iran. We explain these findings in detail
below.
First, we observed no significant change in the proportion of
households facing CHE over the 5-year period. This was
unexpected because as well as clear and unambiguous policy
objectives in the 4th Economic, Social and Cultural
Development Plan of Iran for reducing the level of CHE
(World Bank 2007), major initiatives were adopted in this
period to reduce CHE. We noted a few such initiatives in the
introduction, including the ‘on-the-bed inpatient insurance’
and free-of-charge treatment of those injured in car accidents.
It is therefore difficult to explain why we observed no
significant reduction in CHE. One potential explanation is
that in this period the health care costs increased significantly
(our findings indicate that the median and mean costs doubled
and tripled, respectively). Also it is possible that the current
initiatives may not have tackled the main determinants of
CHE, as we will explain further below; or that they may
Table 2 Number and proportion of households facing catastrophic health care expenditure (CHE) by study variables in the 2003 and 2008 surveys
Variables 2003 survey 2008 survey Variable definition
N (%) N (%)
Total no. households with CHE 73 (12.6%) 70 (11.8%)
Economic status * Economic status based on household total
expenditure
Quintile 1 (poorest) 25 (17%) 23 (18%)
Quintile 2 16 (14%) 9 (14%)
Quintile 3 15 (14%) 21 (13%)
Quintile 4 9 (9%) 8 (9%)
Quintile 5 (richest) 8 (7%) 9 (6%)
Insurance status Whether household has health insurance or not
Have 52 (11%) 47 (11%)
Not have 21 (17%) 23 (15%)
Household head Sex of household head: father, mother or others
Father – 62 (11%)
Mother or other – 8 (18%)
Member 65 * Whether the household has a member aged equal
to or more than 65 years
Have 12 (16%) 21 (17%)
Not have 61 (12%) 49 (10%)
Member 5 Whether the household has a member aged equal
to or less than 5 years
Have 14 (11%) 15 (14%)
Not have 59 (12%) 55 (11%)
Household size Number of household members split in 3
categories
1–2 members 18 (19%) 3 (12%)
3–6 members 48 (11%) 48 (10.5%)
>7 members 7 (12%) 19 (17%)
Disabled member * Whether the household has a disabled member
Have – 21 (20%)
Not have – 49 (10%)
Dentistry usage ** ** Whether the household has expenditure on
dentistry service in the previous month
Have 27 (27%) 29 (14%)
Not have 46 (10%) 41 (8%)
Inpatient service usage * ** Whether the household has expenditure
on inpatient service in the previous year
Have 12 (30%) 13 (56.5%)
Not have 61 (12%) 57 (10%)
Outpatient service usage ** Whether the household has expenditure on
outpatient service in the previous month
Have 67 (14.5%)
Not have 3 (2%)
*P< 0.05; **P< 0.001.
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have been dwarfed by other initiatives (e.g. hospital fundhold-
ing) that inevitably shifted some cost to households (Jafarisirizi
et al. 2011).
Second, the inequality in facing CHE had no significant
change over this period, with households with lower
socio-economic status being more likely to face CHE.
Socio-economic status was the single most important contribu-
tor to inequality in CHE. Factors such as health service
utilization and health insurance, which affected the level of
CHE, had little or no contribution to the socio-economic
inequality in CHE among the socio-economic spectrum of the
population, because they themselves were more or less equally
distributed among the socio-economic spectrum of the popula-
tion. Hence policies that aim to reduce inequality in health
care expenditure must tackle the social determinants of health
and include poverty reduction strategies. Improving the
depth of social health care insurance may also reduce the
effect of socio-economic status on inequality in health-care
usage (Liua et al. 2002).
Except for dentistry service use and outpatient services use
(which were more likely to occur in wealthier households),
other determinant variables increased the socio-economic
inequality, disfavouring the poor. This finding demonstrates
that in order to assess the success or failure of policies aimed at
reducing inequality, measurement of CHE should be comple-
mented with inequality analyses.
Our data also suggest that health services usage, especially of
dentistry services, reduces inequality in CHE as poor people use
fewer health services. In other words, it suggests that as poor
people use relatively less dentistry and outpatient care, they are
less affected by the catastrophic impacts of spending on such
services. And as the use of such services is concentrated in
wealthier families, by increasing the chance of CHE in such
families the inequality in the number of families facing CHE in
different socio-economic groups is reduced. The poor use the
services less and hence they are less likely to face catastrophic
expenditure because of it. A similar picture has been reported in
other studies (van Doorslaer et al. 2006a; Steinhardt et al. 2009).
Table 3 Association between determinants and catastrophic health care expenditure
Variables Adjusted
OR 2003
95% confidence
interval
Adjusted OR 2008
(model comparable
to 2003)
95% confidence
interval
Adjusted OR 2008
(complete model)
95% confidence
interval
Economic status *
Quintile 1 (poorest) 3.10 (1.26–7.79) 3.78 (1.46–9.78) 5.03 (1.82–13.87)
Quintile 2 2.55 (0.99–6.51) 3.76 (1.25–11.27) 4.19 (1.13–13.76)
Quintile 3 2.19 (0.85–5.62) 2.76 (1.10–6.88) 2.78 (1.06–7.25)
Quintile 4 1.44 (0.51–4.05) 1.89 (0.64–5.57) 1.96 (0.639–6.99)
Lack of insurance 1.93* (1.05–3.51) 1.84* (1.00–3.38) 2.42* (1.26–4.65)
Female household head n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a 1.79 (0.69–4.69)
Having member
65 in household
1.66 (0.79–3.48) 1.75 (0.88–3.45) 1.43 (0.69–2.95)
Having member
5 in household
0.82 (0.41–1.64) 1.63 (0.79–3.36) 1.13 (0.53–2.49)
Household size
3–6 members 0.62 (0.31–1.22) 0.54 (0.14–2.03) 0.62 (0.15–2.53)
>7 members 0.93 (0.32–2.62) 0.99 (0.23–4.25) 1.13 (0.24–5.38)
Having disabled member
in household
n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 1.31 (0.64–2.63)
Dentistry service usage 4.09** (2.31–7.24) 6.35** (3.40–11.84) 4.58** (2.36–8.91)
Inpatient service usage 3.52** (1.61–7.69) 11.55** (4.12–32.31) 11.39** (3.76–34.57)
Outpatient service usage n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 1.51** (1.29–1.77)
*P< 0.05; **P< 0.001.
n.a.¼not applicable.
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Figure 2 Concentration curves of facing catastrophic health care
expenditure (CHE) in 2003 and 2008, District 17, Tehran
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Third, the study showed that households with no health
insurance or those using services which were not covered by
health insurance plans (e.g. dental care) spent higher propor-
tions of their capacity to pay on health care. Other studies
worldwide have demonstrated similar results in observational
studies (Berki 1986; Waters et al. 2004; Xu et al. 2007) and in
quasi-experimental designs (Knaul et al. 2006; Somkotra and
Lagrada 2008; Sun et al. 2008). On the other hand, a study in
China showed that where health insurance increases health
care usage, the risk of CHE may also increase (Wagstaff and
Lindelow 2008). These findings suggest that resources should
be spent on managing provider and patient health care usage
patterns as well as provision of health care insurance. Similar to
other studies we also found health service usage (Su et al. 2006;
Adhikari et al. 2009; Somkotra and Lagrada 2009) and house-
hold socio-economic status (Wyszewianski 1986; Merlis 2006;
Su et al. 2006; Sun et al. 2008) to be key determinants of CHE.
Others have found the reverse association between
socio-economic status and CHE (Su et al. 2006; Van Doorslaer
et al. 2006b; Van Doorslaer et al. 2007). Barros and Bertoldi
(2008) suggested that disagreements about the role of
socio-economic status may arise from differences between
studies in defining socio-economic status.
The way we calculated socio-economic status and CHE (Xu
et al. 2007) has some limitations in defining such relationships
for two important reasons. One reason is that the poor who
forgo their needs and do not consume health care are left out of
CHE calculations. The other reason is that the poor who spend
catastrophically on health care increase their capacity to pay
(e.g. through decreasing their other expenditures by going
without food) and total expenditure (e.g. through borrowing
money or selling assets). Both increased capacity to pay and
increased total expenditure push such households towards a
higher socio-economic status in our analyses. As a result the
impact of socio-economic status on CHE may be more prom-
inent than we (and others) have reported.
Fourth, our findings are distinct from a national study of CHE
in 2001. This used routine household expenditure data to
calculate CHE and reported that 2.3% of households in Iran
(range at provincial level: 0.7–4.7%) faced catastrophic expend-
itures. It estimated the household CHE for Tehran province at
2.5% (Razavi et al. 2005). We believe our findings provide a
valid estimate for the district we covered. We reduced bias in
data collection using justifiable sampling methods and data
collection tools. We also re-checked our data with all the
households that reported CHE in 2008.
The differences between our data and the national report may
arise from different factors. It is possible that people in District
17 of Tehran differ from the average in the country and the
province in their health care needs and expenditure. Differences
in the socio-economic status of households in District 17 and
the rest of the country may also contribute to such differences.
Another important factor may be the validity of the data
collection tools and approaches. Routinely collected data for
other purposes [in this case for establishing household general
expenditure patterns and national inflation levels (Razavi et al.
2005)] may not suffice for health care expenditure analysis.
A recent sub-national study, conducted among 189 households
in one district in Kermanshah city, Iran, reported the propor-
tion of households facing CHE, as measured by the WHS
questionnaire, as 22% (Daneshkohan et al. 2011). Another study
in Georgia observed a sharp increase in CHE from 1999 to 2007
Table 4 Decomposition analysis of concentration index of catastrophic health care expenditure in 2008
Coefficient Mean Elasticity Concentration
index (CI)
Contribution
to CI
Contribution
to CI %
Economic status 83%
Quintile 1 1.402 0.216 0.115 0.785 0.090
Quintile 2 1.282 0.108 0.053 0.46 0.024
Quintile 3 1.026 0.280 0.109 0.071 0.008
Quintile 4 0.689 0.152 0.039 0.362 0.014
Lack of insurance 0.836 0.263 0.084 0.095 0.008 6%
Female household head 0.573 0.076 0.016 0.389 0.006 5%
Having member 65 0.567 0.204 0.044 0.099 0.004 3%
Having member 5 0.374 0.179 0.025 0.068 0.002 1%
Household size 8%
3–6 members 0.604 0.772 0.177 0.069 0.012
>7 members 0.078 0.186 0.005 0.357 0.002
Having disabled member 0.335 0.174 0.022 0.357 0.002 2%
Dentistry service use 1.589 0.154 0.092 0.102 0.009 7%
Inpatient service use 2.497 0.039 0.036 0.032 0.001 1%
Outpatient service use 1.789 0.782 0.531 0.005 0.003 2%
CI Ln odds CHE 0.129
Mean 2.64
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(2.8% and 11.7%, respectively). The authors argued one reason
for such a difference might have been the data collection tools:
Household Budget Survey in 1999 and Health Utilization and
Expenditure Survey in 2007 (Gotsadze et al. 2009).
Fifth, we found essential dental care usage to be an important
determinant of CHE. Dentistry services are among the more
expensive health care services in Iran and are not usually
covered in social insurance benefit packages. Most people pay
directly out-of-pocket at the time of use. While we were
re-checking expenditure with CHE households, we asked what
sort of dental care they used. We asked this on suspicion that
they may have used ‘luxury’ services such as orthodency or
other expensive care considered non-essential. We found the
households that had faced CHE and used dental services
reported essential care such as filling, endodontic treatment or
tooth extraction for a decayed tooth. This finding questions the
hypothesis that it is ‘luxury’ dentistry services that result in
CHE, and reinforces the calls to include essential dental care in
social insurance benefit packages.
Our study has other limitations. Our sample was limited to
one district in Tehran which may limit the generalizability of its
findings to other settings. Also our study may have suffered
from a lack of statistical power. We observed relatively wide
confidence intervals for certain outcome measures, which
suggests future studies would benefit from larger samples.
Data about expenditures and service use are usually prone to
recall bias. In this study, we tried to reduce this limitation by
shortening the recall period. Over- and under-estimation of
income and expenditure are other limitations of such studies.
Our approach of using total monthly expenditures for house-
hold classification is more reliable than the alternatives of using
total monthly income (Murray et al. 2003b).
Future research should focus on the limitations of CHE
analysis and develop methods of estimating the bias introduced
through using expenditure data for categorizing household
socio-economic status. It should also consider ways of
incorporating the unmet needs of the poor in the analysis.
A health system may have a very low CHE just because it is not
capable of meeting the population health care needs. Future
research should also make use of quasi-experimental designs
for assessing the impacts of different interventions on CHE
level.
Health financing systems that are perceived to be fair have
the best chance for long-term sustainability (WHO 2010).
Comparing the proportion of households facing CHE and the
concentration index of CHE in both years suggests that there
has been no change in inequality between 2003 and 2008. This
suggests that the pro-poor interventions implemented over the
past few years have not reduced CHE in poor households.
Although our sample is too small for making grand conclu-
sions, it suggests that the lack of a tangible change in the
proportion of households facing CHE may have arisen from
competing trends in Iran’s health system. The spiralling cost of
health care (in part due to general inflation in the country and
in part because of increasing health care tariffs) and the
increasing consumption of expensive high-tech health care
services have clearly overtaken the policy intentions of estab-
lishing effective universal coverage and reducing CHE. Any
solution to the problem of CHE should include interventions
aimed at the social determinants of the CHE (Marmot 2005).
It is essential to improve the social health insurance coverage in
Iran. Such policies should focus on covering households
without insurance protection as well as increasing the depth
of the insurance coverage by expanding the basic benefit
package and reducing co-payments. As the study conducted
was in one district of Tehran, further research should use larger
samples (preferably at national level) to confirm the results.
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